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Abstract
This paper analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public
rangelands. We present an informational and institutional environment where three of
the most prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands ￿input regulation,
cost-sharing/taxation, and performance regulation ￿ can be de￿ned and compared.
The paper examines how the optimal regulation is shaped by the informational and
institutional constraints faced by federal land management agencies (FLMAs) such as
the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. These constraints in-
clude informational asymmetries between ranchers and FLMAs, limitations on FLMAs￿
ability to monitor ranch-level ecological conditions, and constraints on FLMAs￿ac-
tions due to budget limitations and restrictions on the level of penalties they can
assess. The theoretical model extends the previous work of Baker (1992), Prender-
gast (2002), and Hueth and Melkonyan (2009) by considering optimal regulation by a
budget-constrained regulator in an environment of asymmetric information and moral
hazard.
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11 Introduction
Rangeland is the dominant land type in the United States, comprising 34.2% of total
land area (731 million acres), compared to 32.4% forested, 17% agricultural, and 2% ur-
ban (Loomis, 1993). Over 235 million acres of this rangeland is under the management of
the federal government and is used for livestock grazing via contractual arrangements be-
tween ranchers and federal land management agencies (FLMAs). Two FLMAs ￿the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) ￿manage the livestock
grazing leases on over 98% of these 235 million acres (GAO, 2005). Given the amount of
rangeland managed by FLMAs through federal grazing leases, the regulation of ranching on
public rangelands plays a central role in rangeland management and overall natural resource
management in the United States.
Ranching is, in many respects, a prototypical agroecosystem management problem. As
in all agroecosystem management problems, ranching is an activity that generates both
private economic gains for agricultural producers as well as externalities. The externalities
are caused by the in￿ uence of livestock grazing on rangeland vegetation. Grazing stresses
native perennial grasses, reducing their ability to compete with native shrubs, non-native
annual grasses, and noxious weeds. The consequences of change in rangeland vegetation
away from native perennials include reduction in the quality of wildlife habitat for game
animals and sensitive species, increased frequency and severity of wild￿res, and increased
soil erosion.1
While ranchers have private incentives to maintain ecosystem health ￿healthy range-
land provides more productive and sustainable forage base for livestock ￿the externalities
1There exists an extensive literature on the external costs associated with ranching. Keith and Lyon
(1985), Cory and Martin (1985), Roach, Loomis, and Motroni (1996), and Shonkwiler and Englin (2005)
￿nd that livestock grazing and recreation have competing values on public rangelands. Other externalities
have also received attention in the literature. These include the in￿ uence of rangeland degradation on soil
erosion (Knapp, 1996), carbon sequestration (Follett, Kimble, and Lal , 2001; Verburg et al., 2004; Brown et
al., 2006; Havstad et al., 2007), and wild￿re activity (Billings, 1990) and its e⁄ects on ranch pro￿ts (Maher,
2007) and wild￿re suppression costs (Rollins and Kobayashi, 2010). One of the most robust ￿ndings of this
literature is that these external costs increase dramatically with changes in rangeland vegetation away from
native perennial grasses.associated with ranching cause their private objectives to di⁄er from social goals. Re￿ ect-
ing the importance of external costs on public lands, the ￿multiple use￿and ￿sustainable
yield￿mandates of the BLM, USFS, and other FLMAs require these government agencies
to consider the externalities associated with ranching when setting regulation. In particular,
these two mandates require that FLMAs take into account wildlife, watershed health, and
recreation as well as commercial interests such as ranching (multiple use), and that they
work to ensure that the resource values on public lands are available at current levels in
perpetuity (sustainable yield).2
This paper analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public range-
land. We develop a model with two parties: an agent (rancher) that uses the agroecosystem
for private economic gain and a principal (FLMA or regulator) that manages the agroecosys-
tem for both economic gains of the rancher and public goods related to ecosystem health.
We consider an informational environment where the rancher is better informed than the
FLMA about the e⁄ectiveness of her/his actions in achieving both her/his private economic
objectives and in in￿ uencing the public good aspects of ecosystem health, and where there is
moral hazard in the implementation of any regulatory scheme because some of the rancher￿ s
actions cannot be observed by the FLMA. In addition, we assume that the FLMA is con-
strained in its ability to monitor ranch-level ecological conditions. This aspect of the model
re￿ ects the fact that high monitoring costs make it infeasible for FLMAs to engage in regu-
lar and detailed monitoring of ranch-level ecological conditions on public rangelands (Watts,
Shimshack, and LaFrance, 2006). As high monitoring costs make regular and detailed mon-
itoring impossible, FLMAs are forced to base regulation on imperfect signals of how the
ranchers￿activities in￿ uence ecosystem health.
In addition to these informational constraints, we model institutional constraints faced
by FLMAs. It is assumed that the FLMA is constrained by its exogenous budget to fund
policy but can supplement this exogenous budget through taxation. This feature of the
2The USFS adopted the principles of multiple use and sustainable yield with the ￿Multiple Use, Sustained
Yield Act of 1960.￿The BLM followed suit in 1964 with the ￿Classi￿cation and Multiple Use Act of 1964￿ .
2model re￿ ects current practice on public rangelands, where FLMAs have ￿xed budgets in the
short-run but are able to use revenues collected through grazing fees to fund their activities.3
We also consider ranchers￿participation constraints, which require that a rancher￿ s pro￿t
from ranching on public rangeland exceed her/his outside option. As a result, the FLMA
is constrained in the penalties (either monetary or non-monetary) it can assess when it is
socially e¢ cient for the rancher to remain in operation.
The modeled informational and institutional environment allows us to de￿ne the most
prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands and to compare their relative e¢ -
ciency. These instruments are input mandates, where the regulator mandates the level of
usage of certain inputs, cost-sharing/taxation, where the regulator subsidizes or taxes the use
of certain inputs, and performance regulation, where the regulator compensates or penalizes
the rancher based on the value of an observed performance measure.
We begin by analyzing the e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments in light of the
informational and institutional constraints faced by FLMAs. We demonstrate that each
regulatory instrument can be part of an e¢ cient regulatory regime and characterize the
conditions under which each of the three instruments dominates the others. When FLMAs
are unconstrained in the level of bonus or penalty they can assess and when there is perfect
monitoring, the ￿rst-best outcome can be achieved through performance regulation. In a
more realistic setting, however, the FLMA is constrained in the level of bonus/penalty it
can assess and/or monitoring is imperfect. Under these circumstances, both input mandates
and cost-sharing/taxation can dominate performance regulation. After considering each
regulatory instrument in isolation, we consider how the e¢ ciency of the regulatory regime is
improved when performance regulation is used in combination with an input mandate or cost-
sharing/taxation. We identify conditions when an input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation
can improve the e¢ ciency of performance regulation.
3FLMAs, however, are constrained to spend their grazing-fee revenue on ￿range improvement￿projects
and have to give a large portion (roughly 50%) of their grazing-fee revenues to state governments to return
to counties as ￿Payments in Lieu of Taxes￿and to the U.S. Treasury (Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance,
2006).
3To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to compare the e¢ ciency properties of these
three regulatory instruments ￿input mandates, cost-sharing/taxation, and performance reg-
ulation ￿in a setting that captures the salient informational and institutional constraints
faced by FLMAs on public rangelands. By analyzing these three regulatory instruments in
the same model, we provide a platform to compare the optimal mix of regulatory instru-
ments with existing FLMA regulations for ranching on public rangelands. This allows us
to consider how FLMAs￿informational and institutional constraints have shaped existing
regulation and evaluate possible explanations for the continued reliance of FLMAs on in-
put mandates, in the form of grazing restrictions, despite their demonstrated ine¢ ciency in
reaching a target level of environmental performance (e.g., Zhao, 2008). The informational
and institutional constraints on e¢ cient management of public rangelands are shared by
other public agencies tasked with agroecosystem management. As such, the obtained results
concerning the relative e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments have implications that
extend beyond the regulation of ranching on public rangelands.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the
salient features of the regulation of ranching on public rangelands in the United States. In
Section 3, we discuss the relevant literature on regulatory design and its relationship to our
paper. Section 4 develops the basic model. Section 5 characterizes the optimal regulation for
each of the three regulatory instruments, while Section 6 examines their relative e¢ ciency.
In Section 7 we consider optimal performance regulation when used in combination with
an input mandate (Section 7.1) or cost-sharing/taxation (Section 7.2). Finally, Section
8 summarizes the main results and discusses their implications for optimal regulation of
ranching on public rangelands.
42 Regulation on Public Rangelands
FLMAs use several regulatory instruments to reduce the negative externalities associated
with ranching and to ensure that public rangelands are managed in accordance with their
multiple use and sustainable yield mandates. The most prominent regulatory instrument
used by FLMAs are restrictions on the number of livestock ranchers can graze on their
public land allotments.4 Livestock grazing restrictions are aimed at ensuring the long-term
ecological health of public rangeland allotments by limiting the rancher￿ s ability to in￿ ict
ecological harm through over-grazing. In addition, as we explain below, FLMAs can use
the possibility of expanded or reduced grazing privileges to motivate the rancher to manage
their rangeland in accordance with FLMAs￿ecological health objectives.
In principle, grazing restrictions specify the maximum number of livestock a rancher can
run on her/his public land allotment. In practice, however, ranchers are also required to
make ￿substantial use￿of range forage or risk possible loss of grazing privileges. It has been
argued that these provisions, termed ￿non-use￿provisions, often lead ranchers to use public
rangeland more intensively than they would otherwise (Hess and Holechek, 1995).5 Reduced
grazing privileges lower a rancher￿ s potential pro￿ts from ranching and can diminish the sale
value of their grazing permit and base ranch. The combination of the maximum grazing
restrictions and non-use provisions amounts to a de facto mandate that forces most ranchers
to choose the number of livestock they graze on their public rangeland allotment from a
narrow interval.
In addition to facing grazing restrictions, ranchers must pay a per animal, per month
grazing fee. An e¢ cient grazing fee would be set equal to the marginal social value of forage
(marginal social value of grazing an additional animal) that incorporates the marginal forage
value for ranchers and the marginal external environmental costs. Grazing fees on public
4These are often referred to as Animal Unit Month (AUM) restrictions, where an AUM is the amount of
forage needed to sustain one cow and her calf, or one horse, or ￿ve sheep or goats for one month.
5Johnson and Watts (1989) ￿nd relatively low levels of non-use on federal rangelands, ranging from 15%
to 22% between 1963 and 1984.
5rangelands, however, are set nationally, and are thus ine¢ cient for most ranches because
of the heterogeneity of range conditions. Johnson and Watts (1989) ￿nd that despite this
ine¢ ciency and the existence of non-use provisions, stocking rates on public land allotment
are responsive (though not strongly) to changes in grazing fees.6 It has also been suggested
that under certain degraded rangeland conditions, it may be socially e¢ cient to subsidize
grazing above privately optimal levels as a means of noxious weed control and wild￿re fuels
reduction (Papanastasis, 2009).
Besides grazing restrictions and grazing fees, ranchers operating on public rangeland are
often obligated to engage in construction and/or maintenance of ￿range improvements￿as
part of the conditions of their lease (USDI BLM, 2008). ￿Range improvements￿can have
many purposes, including enhancing livestock grazing management, improving watershed
conditions, and enhancing wildlife habitat. ￿Range improvements￿can be structural, such
as water pipes, wells, and fences, or non-structural, such as re-seeding and prescribed burns.
While an FLMA and a rancher will often work jointly to achieve desired ￿range improve-
ments￿￿FLMAs have budgets for ￿range improvements￿that are funded through grazing
fees ￿these activities add to the rancher￿ s cost of operating on public rangelands (Torell
and Doll, 1991; Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell, 1994). A rancher can also propose range im-
provements, either through a Cooperative Range Improvement Agreement, which speci￿es a
division of cost between the FLMA and the rancher, or a Range Improvement Permit, where
the range improvement is completely funded by the rancher.
FLMAs pursue a strategy of both long- and short-term monitoring of the ecological
conditions on public rangeland allotments. Monitoring is performed in order to assess the
ranchers￿compliance with their contractual obligations on their allotments (e.g., range im-
provements) and with the ￿Standards of Rangeland Health,￿which are a series of ecological
health goals set forth by the FLMA (USDI BLM, 2007).7 Long-term monitoring is focused
6Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance (2006) and others have argued that because non-use provisions encour-
age ranchers to graze their maximum allowed number of livestock, grazing fees represent a ￿xed cost rather
than a variable cost for most ranchers.
7The Standards for Rangeland Health that apply to a given allotment are set by local 15-member Resource
6on changes in the status and health of vegetation on an allotment and is generally performed
at the time of permit renewal.8;9 In contrast, short-term monitoring includes monitoring the
time and intensity of grazing, the total number of animals on the allotment, and utilization,
which is a measure of the amount of forage left on the land after the grazing season and the
amount of time that forage is allowed to rejuvenate after grazing (Swanson, 2006; Swanson,
2008: Personal Interview).
If monitoring reveals that current management is degrading rangeland health, or that the
rancher is failing to comply with her/his contractual obligations, this could lead to reduc-
tions in the rancher￿ s grazing privileges or the imposition of mandatory range improvements.
Both of these consequences of monitoring serve as penalties on ranchers for violations of con-
tractual obligations and reduce their expected returns from operating on public rangeland.
Conversely, monitoring can result in the expansion of grazing privileges if current grazing
is found to do limited ecological harm. In this way, monitoring and the associated penal-
ties/bonuses provide the rancher with incentives to manage their allotments in accordance
with the FLMAs￿ecological health objectives.
Advisory Councils. Nevada, for example, has three Resource Advisory Councils: the Mojave-Southern
Great Basin, the Sierra Front-Northwestern Great Basin, and the Northeastern Great Basin (USDI BLM,
2010). Each Resource Advisory Council has ￿ exibility to adapt the Standards of Rangeland Health to local
conditions and priorities. In addition, the ecological indicators used to assess a permittee￿ s compliance with
the Standards for Rangeland Health are set based on the speci￿c ecological, climatic, and topographical
characteristics of the region (Swanson, 2008: Personal Interview). Locally speci￿ed indicators are necessary
because, for example, the appropriate level of ground cover on an allotment may vary signi￿cantly across
publicly-managed rangelands throughout the United States depending on precipitation, soil depth, elevation,
and other factors.
8A long-term goal of FLMAs for public rangelands is to enhance the productivity of range vegetation,
particularly of perennial herbaceous plants or perennial bunch grasses. Perennial bunch grasses provide a
number of ecological services, including the provision of good wildlife habitat and good quality forage, and
are considered to be the best signal of overall rangeland health given the resource values that FLMAs are
interested in promoting (Swanson, 2008: Personal Interview).
9Long-term monitoring is generally performed at the time of permit renewal unless there is a serious
resource concern on the allotment, such as soil erosion or degraded riparian areas, or the rancher is involved
in an ongoing range improvement project that involves a comprehensive monitoring program.
73 Related Literature
Of the three regulatory instruments that we consider in this paper, cost-sharing/taxation in
the form of grazing fees has received the most attention in the previous literature. This focus
on grazing fees can be explained in part by the considerable controversy that federal grazing
fees have generated (Hess and Holecheck, 1995). Some authors argue that federal grazing
fees are set too low relative to the market value of forage (Fowler, Torell and Gallacher, 1994;
LaFrance and Watts, 1995), while others maintain that federal grazing fees are set appro-
priately given the cost of compliance with federal regulations on public rangelands (Torell
and Doll, 1991; Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell, 1994). Several studies construct theoreti-
cal models to characterize the optimal grazing fee in the presence of externalities (McCarl
and Brokken, 1985; Hu⁄aker, Wilen, and Gardner, 1989) and informational asymmetries
between the FLMA and the rancher (Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance, 2006). Relative to
this literature, we consider the optimal grazing fee taking into account both the externalities
associated with ranching and a richer set of informational and institutional constraints faced
by FLMAs. In addition, we consider how the optimal grazing fee is in￿ uenced by other
regulatory instruments in concurrent use on public rangelands.
Regulatory mechanisms other than grazing fees have received substantially less atten-
tion in the literature. In an analysis of input regulation (input mandates), Torell, Lyon,
and Godfrey (1991) develop an optimal control model to examine a rancher￿ s stocking-rate
decisions. The authors consider the relative economic importance of current-period animal
performance and future forage production for a yearling stocker operation in eastern Col-
orado. They ￿nd that current period animal performance de￿ned by weight gain drives
economic stocking-rate decisions. In an analysis of incentive-based mechanisms, Hu⁄aker,
Wilen and Gardner (1989) propose the use of a grazing fee in conjunction with ￿transfer
payments￿based on observed range conditions as a potential mechanism to induce ranch
compliance with the FLMA￿ s ecological health objectives. Our work builds on these studies
by considering both input mandates (stocking-rates) and performance regulation (incentive-
8based mechanisms) in a setting that captures the informational and institutional constraints
on public rangelands and allows for the e¢ ciency of these regulatory instruments, along with
cost-sharing/taxation, to be de￿ned and compared.
There is a large and burgeoning economics literature on regulatory design. A number
of studies in this literature examine the relative merits of quantity instruments (input man-
dates), price instruments (cost-sharing/taxation), and performance regulation. Weitzman
(1974) demonstrates how a quantity instrument can dominate price instruments when there
is uncertainty and asymmetric information in policy design. The simultaneous use of di⁄er-
ent regulatory instruments has also been analyzed. Shavell (1984) studies an environment
where multiple instruments emerge as an optimal regulatory response to accident risk. In
a related analysis, Innes (1998) shows how ex ante safety standards (similar to the input
mandates in our analysis) can be welfare-reducing when optimal liability rules (performance
regulation) are feasible and when there is ￿rm heterogeneity and uncertainty in the level of
harm caused by an accident. Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) provide a di⁄erent rationale
for the joint use of regulation with ex post liability for harm by noting that speci￿cation of a
minimum level of care can in￿ uence ￿rms￿perceptions of the negligence standard that will be
enforced by a court of law. More recently, Hueth and Melkonyan (2009) consider the relative
merits of three regulatory mechanisms ￿performance, process, and design standards ￿for
a pollution-generating ￿rm in the presence of environmental risk. The authors demonstrate
that each type of regulation can improve welfare relative to no regulation. They also analyze
the relative merits of joint use of these regulatory instruments.
The present paper makes three innovations relative to the received literature. First,
we construct a model where closed-form expressions for the social welfare under the three
regulatory instruments can be derived. This, in turn, allows us to directly compare the
e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments and examine how their relative e¢ ciency is
in￿ uenced by the informational and institutional constraints faced by the regulator. Second,
we examine the simultaneous use of multiple regulatory instruments, identify circumstances
9under which it is most advantageous for the regulator to use multiple instruments, and
examine how the e¢ cient use of each individual instrument changes when a mixture of
instruments is optimal. Third, we consider optimal regulation in the presence of budget
constraints. In doing this, we are contributing to the literature on optimal contracting
with a budget-constrained principal operating under imperfect information. The previous
literature on optimal contracting under a budget constraint has focused on procurement
problems, where the principal designs contracts to overcome adverse selection (Levaggi,
2004; Gautier, 2004; Anthon et al., 2007). In contrast, the informational environment in
our model entails both asymmetric information and moral hazard. We ￿nd that the budget
constraint causes the regulator to rely on instruments that would otherwise be ine¢ cient.
An important component of the economics literature on regulatory design is the large
and growing body of work on the optimal design of environmental regulation in agriculture.
By and large, this literature has focused on the case where the principal has the dual goals of
limiting environmental externalities and providing income support to agricultural producers,
and where the e¢ ciency of regulation is undermined by adverse selection. Studies in this
vain include Bontems, Turpin, and Rotillon (2005), Feng (2007), and Sheri⁄ (2008).10 In
a context similar to these studies, Bontems and Bourgeon (2005) investigate the proper-
ties of the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy assuming that emissions
can be observed through costly audits and that private information remains even when an
audit is performed. In a related analysis, Bontems and Albon (2006) present a model of
pollution regulation for a risk averse farmer facing production risk from nitrogen leaching.
Our framework is similar to their model which incorporates moral hazard and private infor-
mation on the producer￿ s part about farm-level ecological conditions. In contrast to these
studies, we do not consider adverse selection (ranchers operating on public land allotments
10Feng (2007) characterizes optimal policy where both farmer e¢ ciency and farm size are unobservable
to the principle. Sheri⁄ (2008) considers optimal policy with asymmetric information and stochastic prices.
Bontems, Turpin, and Rotillon (2005) consider the regulation of nonpoint source pollution through non-linear
taxation/subsidization explicitly taking into account political power of farmers and the distribution of farm
incomes.
10cannot opt out of regulation), nor does income support for producers enter the principal￿ s
objective (unlike in many other agricultural contexts, income support for ranchers is not
an explicit goal of FLMA policy). We also do not consider monitoring of farmer (rancher)
compliance with environmental regulation.11 Indeed, out model departs from the litera-
ture by examining how the combination of the institutional and informational constraints
faced by FLMAs (described above) in￿ uences the relative e¢ ciency of three pervasive and
relatively unsophisticated regulatory instruments (subsidy/taxation, input regulation, and
performance regulation).
Finally, on a purely formal level, our analysis is related to the work of Baker (1992),
Prendergast (2002), and Hueth and Melkonyan (2009). Baker (1992) considers incentive
contracts based on a performance measure that is di⁄erent from the principal￿ s objectives.
Similarly to Baker (1992), we ￿nd that the e¢ ciency of regulation depends on the relationship
between the principal￿ s objective and the performance measure on which regulation is based.
Prendergast (2002) demonstrates that output-based incentives are preferable to input-based
incentives when there is uncertainty regarding the appropriate technology for a given task.
Hueth and Melkonyan (2009) identify alternative relative bene￿ts of output-based and input-
based incentives. Our model extends these three studies by examining multiple regulatory
instruments under an alternative informational environment and by considering additional
institutional constraints.
4 Model
We consider a strategic interaction between two parties, a regulator (she) and a rancher (he).
The rancher utilizes a production process with two inputs, denoted by e1 and e2: In addition
to in￿ uencing the rancher￿ s private payo⁄, these inputs a⁄ect the health of the ecosystem
where the rancher carries out his production activities and, by doing so, cause externalities.
11Rather, we consider a setting where a bonus/penalty is assessed to the rancher based on imperfect ex
post monitoring of ranch-level ecological conditions, but where compliance with regulation is not considered.
11In the absence of regulation, the rancher￿ s private payo⁄ function is given by
F (e1;e2) ￿ w1e1 ￿ w2e2;
where F (e1;e2) has the quadratic form
F (e1;e2) =
￿




￿2e2 ￿ ￿2 (e2)
2￿
;
where ￿1;￿2 > 0; ￿1 > w1 > 0; and ￿2 > w2 > 0: We assume that e1 is purchased from
a market and w1 represents the market price of e1: In contrast, e2 represents the rancher￿ s
e⁄ort directed toward enhancing production and/or the ecosystem health and w2 represents
the marginal cost of e⁄ort e2:




[F (e1;e2) ￿ w1e1 ￿ w2e2]:
Since the rancher￿ s private payo⁄function is strictly concave, the ￿rst-order conditions of this
optimization problem, as well as of the other optimization problems in this paper, are both







for i = 1;2: (1)
Under our assumption that ￿1 ￿ w1 > 0 and ￿2 ￿ w2 > 0 the rancher will choose strictly
positive levels of e1 and e2 in the absence of regulation.
The social value of the public good related to ecosystem health is given by
V (e1;e2;"1;"2) = (￿11 + ￿12"1)e1 + (￿21 + ￿22"2)e2;
where "i (i = 1;2) is a random variable with support [￿￿ "i;￿ "i]; E ("i) = 0, and V ar("i) = ￿2
"i:
12Thus, the social value of the public good is a random variable whose distribution is a⁄ected
by the rancher￿ s choice of inputs. It is assumed that the rancher learns the realizations of
random variables "1 and "2 before making his choice of inputs e1 and e2. In contrast, the
regulator does not observe the realizations of "1 and "2: Given our speci￿cation, an increase
in input ei (i = 1;2) leads to an increase in the variance of V .
The expected social welfare, U, is de￿ned as the expectation of the sum of the rancher￿ s
private payo⁄, F (e1;e2)￿w1e1￿w2e2, and the value of the public good related to ecosystem
health, V (e1;e2;"1;"2). Since any payment related to a regulatory instrument is a transfer
between the regulator and the rancher, it does not in￿ uence the social welfare.
Using eNR
1 and eNR



































￿i1 (￿i ￿ wi)
2￿i
:
The expected social welfare without regulation will be used as a benchmark against which
the e¢ ciency of each regulatory mechanism will be compared.
Another important benchmark for accessing the e¢ cacy of di⁄erent regulatory mecha-




[F (e1;e2) ￿ w1e1 ￿ w2e2 + V (e1;e2;"1;"2)]:







0; if ￿i + ￿i1 + ￿i2"i ￿ wi
￿i￿wi+￿i1+￿i2"i
2￿i ; otherwise
for i = 1;2: (3)
13We assume that ￿i+￿i1+￿i2"i > wi (i = 1;2) for all "i 2 [￿￿ "i;￿ "i], so that the socially optimal
choices of e1 and e2 are always strictly positive. Note that the ￿rst-best level of input ei
is a non-constant function of random variable "i: More intuitively, the ￿rst-best requires
that the rancher optimally use his private information. For example, when parameter ￿i2 is
strictly positive the ￿rst-best calls for the rancher to increase the use of input ei in response
to increases in "i:







































It follows immediately from (2) and (4) that when the expected marginal product of either
e1 or e2 on ecosystem health is non-zero ￿i.e., ￿i1 = E (Vei) 6= 0, i = 1;2 ￿the rancher￿ s
private optimal choices of e1 and e2 in the absence of regulation are socially ine¢ cient. The
extent of the ine¢ ciency is positively a⁄ected by the expected marginal social values of the
rancher￿ s e⁄orts jE (Ve1)j and jE (Ve2)j. Expression (4) also reveals that the ine¢ ciency of
the rancher￿ s private optimum in the absence of regulation is independent of whether input
ei is detrimental (E (Vei) < 0) or bene￿cial (E (Vei) > 0) to ecosystem health. In addition,
the degree of the ine¢ ciency of the rancher￿ s privately optimal choices, eNR
1 and eNR
2 , is
increasing in the variance of the expected marginal social values of the rancher￿ s e⁄orts,
V ar(Vei), i = 1;2, which measure the value of the rancher￿ s private information regarding
the e⁄ect of input ei on rangeland ecological health. It follows from (4) that the higher the
value of the rancher￿ s private information V ar(Vei) the larger the di⁄erence between the
expected social welfare under the ￿rst-best and unregulated outcomes.
5 Regulatory Instruments
Recognizing that the rancher￿ s privately optimal choices of e1 and e2 do not fully take into
account the e⁄ect of his activities on the public good associated with ecosystem health,
14the regulator contemplates introducing a regulatory mechanism. The regulator has three
regulatory instruments at her disposal to improve upon the unregulated outcome; (1) in-
put mandate, where the regulator ￿xes the rancher￿ s use of the observable input, (2) cost-
sharing/taxation, where the regulator subsidizes/taxes the rancher￿ s use of the observable
input, and (3) performance regulation, where the regulator pays/taxes the rancher based on
the value of an observable performance measure related to the rancher￿ s use of inputs e1 and
e2.
The regulator, however, does not have full ￿ exibility when choosing a regulatory mecha-
nism. First, the regulator faces informational constraints. It is assumed that the rancher￿ s
private payo⁄, F (e1;e2)￿w1e1￿w2e2, and use of input e2 are not observable by the regula-
tor and, as a result, cannot be a part of a regulatory mechanism. In addition, the regulator
observes only a subset of relevant ecosystem health outcomes over which the rancher has
in￿ uence. This subset of ecosystem health outcomes ￿henceforth termed the performance
measure ￿provides an imperfect signal of the impact of the rancher￿ s choices of e1 and e2
on ecosystem health. Hence, a regulatory instrument can only be conditioned on the real-
izations of e1 and the performance measure, and not on the rancher￿ s use of e2 or on the
realizations of the rancher￿ s private payo⁄, F (e1;e2) ￿ w1e1 ￿ w2e2, or the public good re-
lated to ecosystem health, V (e1;e2;"1;"2). It is further assumed that the regulator has full
knowledge of how the observable input, e1, in￿ uences the rancher￿ s private payo⁄.
Second, the regulator￿ s choice of a regulatory mechanism is constrained by her avail-
able budget B ￿ 0; the regulator cannot implement a regulatory mechanism for which the
expected budget outlay exceeds B. In contrast, the ex post payment to the rancher may
exceed B. The assumption that the budget cannot be exceeded ex ante is reasonable in
circumstances where the regulator is proposing a regulatory mechanism to a large number
of ranchers, so that instances where the regulator￿ s ex post payment to a rancher exceeds B
are balanced by instances where it is smaller than B.
The timing in our model is as follows. First, the regulator announces the regulatory
15mechanism, and the rancher learns the level of each regulatory instrument. Subsequently,
the rancher learns the realization of uncertainty concerning the impact of his choices of e1
and e2 on the performance measure and selects e1 and e2. Then, the realization of the
performance measure is observed by both parties and the regulator also learns the rancher￿ s
choice of e1: Finally, the payments (if any) are made between the regulator and the rancher.
5.1 Input Mandate
Input regulation in the form of grazing restrictions is the most prominent form of regulation
on public rangelands. As we discussed in Section 2, non-use provisions in federal grazing
leases imply that grazing restrictions are de facto mandates for most ranchers operating on
public rangeland. For this reason, we consider the scenario where the regulator mandates the
rancher￿ s choice of the observable input, denoted by ￿ e1. Under this regulatory instrument,
the rancher has to pay a relatively high penalty if his use of e1 di⁄ers from ￿ e1 and, as a result,
the rancher never ￿nds it advantageous to violate the mandate. It is costless for the regulator
to enforce the input mandate, so that the regulator￿ s budget constraint is not relevant when
only this regulatory instrument is used.12 Note also that the regulator cannot condition e1
on the realization of "1 since the regulator does not observe this information. Due to this
rigidity and the fact that the ￿rst-best calls for input e1 to vary with the rancher￿ s private
information "1; the input mandate will be unable to restore the ￿rst-best.
Since e1 and e2 are neither complements nor substitutes in the rancher￿ s private payo⁄
function, mandating ￿ e1 does not in￿ uence the rancher￿ s choice of e2. As such, provided the
rancher uses the public rangeland he will set e2 equal to the unregulated level eNR
2 given by
12Monitoring, of course, is not costless. Indeed, the Government Accountability O¢ ce (GAO) estimates
that monitoring costs on public rangelands exceed all of the grazing fees collected (cited in Watts, Shimshack,
and LaFrance, 2006). Our assumption of zero monitoring costs, however, is equivalent to assuming that
the regulator￿ s budget for monitoring is not related to her budget to fund regulation. This assumption
approximates the current policy at the BLM and USFS where grazing fees can be used to fund ￿range
improvements￿and other regulation but not monitoring (Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance, 2006).


























￿ w1￿ e1 ￿ w2e
NR
2 ￿ 0:
First, consider the case where the regulator￿ s optimization problem (5) is unconstrained.




￿1 + ￿11 ￿ w1
2￿1
;
which is simply the expectation of the socially optimal level of input e1 from (3). If the












































￿ w1￿ e1 ￿ w2eNR
2 = 0: In what follows, we focus on the
former case where the optimization problem (5) has an interior solution.













Because the regulator knows how e1 in￿ uences both F and E (V ) (though ex post she
cannot directly observe either F or V ), she can set e1 at the expected social optimum
￿
eI
1 = E [e￿
1 ("1)]
￿
. Hence, when the expected marginal product of the observable input e1 on
ecosystem health is non-zero, E (Ve1) 6= 0; the input mandate will increase welfare relative
to the unregulated outcome. The input mandate, however, can not restore the ￿rst-best
17outcome unless the expected marginal product of the unobservable input e2 on the ecosystem
health is zero, E (Ve2) = ￿21 = 0, and the rancher does not possess private information
regarding the e⁄ect of his inputs on the health of ecosystem, V ar(Ve1) = V ar(Ve2) = 0.
5.2 Cost-Sharing/Taxation
We now turn to examining the scenario where the regulator either subsidizes (cost-sharing)
or taxes the rancher￿ s use of the observable input e1. In both cases, the cost of input e1
incurred by the rancher is (1￿s)w1e1, while the cost borne by the regulator is sw1e1. Thus,
s > 0 corresponds to cost-sharing while s < 0 represents taxation. As we discussed in
Section 2, taxation of forage use through grazing fees is an important element of FLMA
policy on public rangelands. In addition to taxation, we consider cost-sharing because it has
been suggested that in certain degraded rangeland conditions, it may be socially e¢ cient
to subsidize grazing above privately optimal levels as a means of noxious weed control and
wild￿re fuels reduction.











Note that similarly to the input mandate the rancher does not use his private information
regarding the e⁄ect of the inputs on the health of ecosystem when he chooses e1 and e2.
Also, as in the previous subsection, the rancher￿ s choice of e2 under cost-sharing is equal to
the unregulated level given by (1).
Given the rancher￿ s choice of eC
1 as a function of s, the regulator￿ s optimization problem

























18subject to the regulator￿ s budget constraint
B ￿ ￿ + sw1e
C
1 (s); (7)









￿ (1 ￿ s)w1e
C
1 (s) ￿ w2e
NR
2 + ￿ ￿ 0; (8)
where ￿ is a lump-sum transfer between the rancher and the regulator. Combining the


































1 (s) ￿ w2e
NR
2 + B ￿ 0:
In what follows we focus on the case where ￿1 > (1 ￿ s)w1 and eC









































2 ￿ ￿2 (eNR
2 )
2i
+ 4￿1B ￿ 2w1￿1 + w2
1 ￿ sw1 ￿ 0:
Let ^ sC denote the solution to the unconstrained problem (9). We have that
^ s
C = E (Ve1)=w1 = ￿11=w1:








2 ) ￿ w1eNR
1 ￿ w2eNR
2 + B]:
19By concavity of the objective function in (9) and the structure of its constraint, the
regulator￿ s constraint in (9) is binding at the optimum if and only if ^ sC > sC (B). This
inequality applies only if the e⁄ects of e1 on the rancher￿ s private economic objective and
on the public good aspects of ecosystem health are congruent (E (Ve1) = ￿11 > 0) so that
cost-sharing is optimal. Using the expressions for ^ sC and sC (B); we obtain that ^ sC ￿ sC (B)























Hence, the optimal cost-sharing parameter s and the resulting choice of input e1 by the
rancher are given, respectively, by
^ s
C and ^ e
C
1 = E [e
￿
1 ("1)] =
￿1 ￿ w1 + ￿11
2￿1
; if ￿11 ￿ 0 or
￿




C (B) and e
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2 ) ￿ w1eNR
1 ￿ w2eNR
2 + B]; otherwise.










4￿1; if ￿11 ￿ 0 or
￿











A couple of observations regarding these results are in order. First, when taxation is
optimal (￿11 ￿ 0) or when cost-sharing is optimal (￿11 > 0) and the regulator has a rela-
tively large budget so that the budget constraint is slack at the optimum (B ￿ BC), the
elicited choices of the inputs and the resulting expected social welfare under the optimal
cost-sharing/taxation mechanism coincide with those under the optimal input mandate.
This equivalence between the two regulatory instruments is an artefact of the model￿ s in-
20formation and production structures. The regulator knows how e1 in￿ uences F and, hence,
how changes in the marginal cost of e1 in￿ uence the rancher￿ s choice of e1. As a result, the
regulator can choose s to achieve the expected socially optimal usage E [e￿
1 ("1)]. This implies
that, as was the case with the optimally chosen input mandate, cost-sharing/taxation im-
proves e¢ ciency relative to the unregulated outcome when E (Ve1) 6= 0: However, it cannot
restore the ￿rst-best unless E (Ve2) = 0 and V ar(Ve1) = V ar(Ve2) = 0.
Second, when cost-sharing is optimal and the budget constraint is binding, the expected
social welfare under the optimal cost-sharing mechanism is lower than the expected social
welfare under the optimal input mandate. The extent of the decrease in the expected social
welfare caused by the budget constraint is determined by the di⁄erence between the expected
socially optimal usage of the observable input, E [e￿
1 ("1)], and the level dictated by the
regulator￿ s budget constraint, eC
1 (B). This ine¢ ciency is decreasing in the regulator￿ s budget
B (since eC
1 (B) is increasing in B while E [e￿
1 ("1)] is independent of B) and increasing in
the expected marginal social value of the rancher￿ s e⁄ort E (Ve1) = ￿11 > 0 (since E [e￿
1 ("1)]
is increasing in ￿11 while eC
1 (B) is independent of ￿11). Finally, we conclude from these
two ￿ndings that an optimally chosen input mandate weakly dominates an optimally chosen
cost-sharing arrangement.
5.3 Performance Regulation
Suppose that both the rancher and the regulator observe an imperfect signal of how the
rancher￿ s use of e1 and e2 in￿ uences ecological health:
P (e1;e2;￿1;￿2) = (￿11 + ￿12￿1)e1 + (￿21 + ￿22￿2)e2;
where ￿i (i = 1;2) is a random variable with support [￿￿ ￿i;￿ ￿i]; E (￿i) = 0 and V ar(￿i) = ￿2
￿i:
It is further assumed that Corr("i;￿i) > 0 for i = 1;2: Note that the e⁄ect of input ei on the
variance of the performance measure P is similar to that for the social value of the public
21good; the variance of P is increasing in e1 and e2. It is assumed that performance measure, P,
is veri￿able so that it can be a part of a regulatory mechanism. We consider a linear incentive
contract of the form ￿ + ￿P; where ￿ is a lump-sum transfer between the regulator and the
￿rm (the base payment) and ￿ ￿ 0 is the piece rate per unit of the performance measure
P (the power of the incentive contract). We call this regulatory instrument performance
regulation.
Before turning to the formal analysis note that performance regulation has a key advan-
tage over the other two instruments. It provides the rancher with incentives to respond to
private information about ￿1 and ￿2: When random variables ￿1 and ￿2 are correlated with
random variables "1 and "2, respectively, performance regulation gives the rancher the incen-
tive and ￿ exibility to adjust his choice of inputs based on his private knowledge of ranch-level
ecological conditions and the a⁄ect of the inputs on ecosystem health. As we formally show
below, the bene￿t of giving the rancher this ￿ exibility is increasing in the accuracy of the
performance measure (as measured by its distortion (Corr("i;￿i) ; i = 1;2) and noisiness
(V ar(Pei); i = 1;2)) and in the value of the rancher￿ s private information V ar(Ve1) and
V ar(Ve2).
The rancher￿ s optimization problem under performance regulation is given by
max
e1;e2
[F (e1;e2) ￿ w1e1 ￿ w2e2 + ￿ + ￿P (e1;e2;￿1;￿2)]:







0; if ￿i + ￿ (￿i1 + ￿i2￿i) ￿ wi
￿i￿wi+￿(￿i1+￿i2￿i)
2￿i ; otherwise
for i = 1;2:
Given the rancher￿ s choices eP
1 (￿;￿1) and eP
2 (￿;￿2), the regulator￿ s optimization problem















1 (￿;￿1) ￿ w2e
P








subject to the regulator￿ s budget constraint
























1 (￿;￿1) ￿ w2e
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1 (￿;￿1) ￿ w2e
P

























+ B ￿ 0:
In what follows, we focus on the scenarios where the regulator￿ s optimal choice of ￿ is such
that ￿1 + ￿ (￿11 + ￿12￿1) > w1 for all ￿1 2 [￿￿ ￿1;￿ ￿1] and ￿2 + ￿ (￿21 + ￿22￿2) > w2 for
all ￿2 2 [￿￿ ￿2;￿ ￿2]. This assumption ensures that eP
1 (￿;￿1) > 0 for all ￿1 2 [￿￿ ￿1;￿ ￿1] and
eP
2 (￿;￿2) > 0 for all ￿2 2 [￿￿ ￿2;￿ ￿2].
The algorithm for identifying the optimal solution to the optimization problem (14) is
similar to that in the previous subsection. Let ^ ￿
P
denote the solution to the unconstrained































23The solution to the binding constraint in (14) is denoted by ￿






































Using the expressions for ^ ￿
P
and ￿
P (B); we obtain that ^ ￿
P
￿ ￿





























By concavity of the objective function in (14) and the form of the constraint in (14),















P (B) and e
P
i (￿i;B) =
￿i ￿ wi + ￿
P (B)(￿i1 + ￿i2￿i)
2￿i
; otherwise:



































A number of results follow immediately from the expression for ^ ￿
P
.13 First, the power of
the incentive scheme is determined by the expected marginal social values of the rancher￿ s
e⁄ort jE (Vei)j (i = 1;2). This is the case irrespective of whether input ei is detrimen-
tal (E (Vei) < 0) or bene￿cial (E (Vei) > 0) to ecosystem health. Second, note that
13The expression for the optimal performance regulation when the budget constraint is slack, ^ ￿
P
, is
analogous to the expression for the optimal power of an incentive contract in Baker (1992).
24Corr(Pei;Vei) = Corr("i;￿i) captures the level of distortion in the performance measure.
It follows from the expression for ^ ￿
P
that the less distorted the performance measure (the
larger Corr("i;￿i)) the more valuable it is in providing incentives to the rancher. As a result,
the power of the incentive mechanism is increasing in both Corr("1;￿1) and Corr("2;￿2).
Third, observe that V ar(Pei) captures the noisiness of the performance measure. An in-
crease in the noisiness of the performance measure decreases its value to the regulator for
providing incentives to the rancher. As a result, the regulator will o⁄er a lower-powered
incentive scheme under a relatively noisy performance measure. Finally, the power of the
incentive scheme is increasing in the variances of the expected marginal social values of the
rancher￿ s e⁄orts, V ar(Ve1) and V ar(Ve2); which measure the value of the rancher￿ s private
information regarding the e⁄ect of his inputs on ecosystem health.
When the constraint in (14) is binding, the optimal piece rate per unit of the perfor-
mance measure, ￿
P (B), is determined by the regulator￿ s ability to fund regulation, which



















> 0, higher rents from ranching without regulation
allow the regulator to fund a larger ￿
P (B) by transferring more money from the rancher










< 0 (ex ante penalty), higher rents from ranching with-
out regulation allow the regulator to impose a larger ￿
P (B) without violating the rancher￿ s
participation constraint.
Consider now the expected social welfare. First, note that performance regulation al-
ways increases welfare relative to the unregulated outcome. When the budget constraint
is not binding, the extent to which performance regulation improves welfare is determined
by the same factors that determine the power of the incentive scheme; the expected social
welfare is increasing in the expected marginal social values of the rancher￿ s inputs jE (Vei)j,
decreasing in the level of distortion of the performance measure (relatively small values of
25Corr("i;￿i)), decreasing in the noisiness of the performance measure, V ar(Pei), and increas-
ing in the variance of the expected marginal social values of the rancher￿ s inputs, V ar(Vei).
Importantly, the quality of the performance measure is a critical determinant of the bene￿ts
of performance regulation. When the performance measure provides a good signal of how
the rancher￿ s actions in￿ uence ecosystem health (low distortion and noisiness), performance
regulation can substantially increase the expected social welfare.
The expected social welfare under a binding budget constraint is lower than under a slack
budget constraint. From (18), the loss in the expected social welfare resulting from a binding














Expression (19) reveals that the loss in the expected social welfare is a function of the di⁄er-
ence between the second-best optimal piece rate, ^ ￿
P
, and the level dictated by the regulator￿ s
budget constraint, ￿
P (B). This ine¢ ciency is decreasing in the regulator￿ s budget, B, and








2 , which increase
￿
P (B) but do not a⁄ect ^ ￿
P
. Moreover, this ine¢ ciency is increasing in the expected mar-
ginal social values of the rancher￿ s e⁄orts, jE" (Vei)j = j￿i1j (i = 1;2), which increase ^ ￿
P
but
do not a⁄ect ￿
P (B).
Finally, when the performance measure is a perfect signal of the rancher￿ s input choices
(V (e1;e2;"1;"2) = P (e1;e2;￿1;￿2) for each e1 and e2) and the regulator￿ s budget constraint
does not bind (B ￿ BP), performance regulation can achieve the social optimum given by
(4).14 To see this, note that (15) implies that ^ ￿
P
= 1 under perfect monitoring. Substituting
^ ￿
P
= 1 and V (e1;e2;"1;"2) = P (e1;e2;￿1;￿2) for each e1 and e2 into (18) yields (4). On the
other hand, when the regulator￿ s budget constraint binds (B < BP), the ￿rst-best outcome
cannot be achieved even with perfect monitoring.
14Perfect monitoring implies that E" (Vei) = E￿ (Vei), V ar(Vei) = V ar(Pei), and Cov (Pei;Vei) = p
V ar(Vei)
p
V ar(Pei) = V ar(Vei) (i = 1;2) for all e1 and e2.
26Figure 1: The relative e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments
6 Pairwise Comparisons of Regulatory Instruments
By construction of the model ￿the rancher has no private information about how e1 and e2
in￿ uence his private objective ￿the input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation are equivalent
when the regulator￿ s budget constraint does not bind. However, when the regulator￿ s budget
constraint binds under the optimal cost-sharing arrangement, the input mandate strictly
dominates the cost-sharing arrangement.
Since the optimal input mandate weakly dominates cost-sharing/taxation, we focus on




; is a⁄ected by the parameters of the model. When the regulator￿ s budget
constraint does not bind (B ￿ BP), the optimal input mandate dominates the optimal















It follows from this inequality that the e¢ ciency of the performance regulation relative
27to the input mandate is determined by the same factors that determine the power of the
incentive scheme. In particular, the performance regulation is more likely to dominate the
input mandate when (i) the performance measure is less distorted (larger Corr(Pei;Vei) =
Corr("i;￿i), i = 1;2), (ii) the performance measure is less noisy (smaller V ar(Pei), i = 1;2),
and (iii) the rancher￿ s information regarding the e⁄ect of his inputs on ecosystem health is
more valuable (large V ar(Vei), i = 1;2).
When the regulator￿ s budget constraint binds (B < BP), the input mandate dominates



















Thus, when B < BP, the e¢ ciency of the performance regulation relative to the input
mandate is determined by the factors that a⁄ect both ^ ￿
P
and ￿
P (B), which are the the
optimal piece rates under a non-binding and binding budget constraints, respectively. It
follows from (20) that the optimal performance regulation is more likely to dominate the
optimal input mandate when the regulator has a greater ability to fund regulation, which,
as we explain in Section 5.3, is determined by her exogenous budget, B, and the rents from








2 . Note also that if the input
mandate dominates the performance regulation when the regulator￿ s budget constraint does
not bind then it will dominate the performance regulation for all B.














1 ￿ ^ ￿
P￿












P (B) are given by (15) and (16), respectively. Since ^ ￿
P
;￿
P (B) ￿ 1; it follows
from (21) that the e¢ ciency of the input mandate relative to the performance regulation is
increasing in the expected marginal product of the observable input, e1, on ecosystem health
28jE (Ve1)j = j￿11j.
Figure 1 illustrates how the relative e¢ ciency of the three regulatory instruments is
determined by the regulator￿ s exogenous budget, B, for the case when the expected marginal
product of the observable input, e1, on ecosystem health is positive, i.e., E (Ve1) = ￿11 > 0.
We focus on the case where E (Ve1) > 0 in Figure 1 because it is only when E (Ve1) > 0 that
the regulator￿ s budget constraint is relevant for cost-sharing/taxation.15 Figure 1 depicts two
parameterizations of the model. In Case 1, the expected social welfare under performance
regulation is higher than under the input mandate (and, hence, cost-sharing) when the
regulator￿ s budget is su¢ ciently large (B ￿ max
￿
BC;BP￿
). In Case 2, the expected social
welfare under the input mandate is higher than under performance regulation for all B.
Finally, consider the e¢ ciency of the optimal performance regulation relative to the
optimal cost-sharing/taxation. When cost-sharing is preferred to taxation (E (Ve1) > 0), we
demonstrate in the Appendix that cost-sharing dominates performance regulation for some
B if and only if the dominance holds for all B. Thus, while the regulator￿ s budget constraint
determines her choice between the input mandate and performance regulation, it does not
in￿ uence her choice between cost-sharing and performance regulation.
When taxation is preferred to cost-sharing (E (Ve1) < 0), it follows from (11) and (18)
that if taxation dominates performance regulation when the regulator￿ s budget constraint
does not bind, then it will dominate performance regulation for all B. It is also the case that
if performance regulation dominates taxation when B = 0, then this dominance holds for all
B. If neither of these two cases hold, then the regulator￿ s budget constraint determines her
choice between taxation and performance regulation. In particular, there exists a critical
level of B (< BP) below which UC > UP and above which UC < UP. Thus, taxation is
preferred to performance regulation under a relatively tight budget.
15When E (Ve1) < 0, the regulator institutes taxation of e1 (s < 0), her budget does not constrain the
choice of s; and the expected social welfare under taxation and an input mandate coincide for all B.
297 Joint Use of Regulatory Instruments
7.1 Performance-Regulation and Input Mandate
We now turn to the joint use of the input mandate and performance regulation. Under this
scenario, the regulator mandates the rancher￿ s choice of the observable input, denoted by
￿ ePI
1 , and institutes a payment to/from the rancher based on the ex post realization of the
veri￿able performance measure, P: As in Section 5.3, this ex post payment is made according
to the linear incentive contract ￿PI + ￿
PIP, where ￿PI is a lump-sum transfer between the
regulator and the rancher and ￿
PI ￿ 0 is the piece rate per unit of P. It is also assumed
that the rancher has to pay a relatively high penalty if his use of e1 di⁄ers from ￿ ePI
1 and, as
a result, the rancher never ￿nds it advantageous to violate the mandate.
The rancher￿ s optimization problem under the joint use of the input mandate and per-
































0; if ￿2 + ￿



































































































































































+ B ￿ 0:
In what follows, we focus on the scenario where the regulator￿ s optimal choice of ￿
PI is
such that ￿2 + ￿







> 0 for all ￿2 2 [￿￿ ￿2;￿ ￿2].
Due to space considerations we only report the results for the non-binding budget con-
straint case. The results regarding the role of the regulator￿ s informational constraints for the
relative e¢ ciency of the joint use of the input mandate and performance regulation for the
binding budget constraint case are similar to the non-binding case. However, the derivation
and presentation of these results are considerably more involved.
The solution to the unconstrained problem (24) is denoted by ^ ePI







￿1 + E (Ve1) ￿ w1
2￿1
=










































It follows directly from (6) and (25) that using an input mandate and performance
regulation in tandem is unambiguously preferred to the use of the input mandate in isolation.
Similarly, it follows from (18) and (25) that the input mandate improves the e¢ ciency of the
performance regulation for large B (for B ￿ max
￿
BC;BP￿





































is de￿ned by (15). This inequality demonstrates that the input mandate is more
likely to improve the e¢ ciency of performance regulation when the expected marginal prod-
uct of the observable input, e1, on ecosystem health, j￿11j = jE (Ve1)j, is large, and when
the performance measure provides a poor signal of in￿ uence of e1 on ecosystem health, i.e.,
high distortion (low Corr("1;￿1)) and noisiness (high V ar(Pei)) (see Section 5.3). Under
these conditions, the input mandate improves welfare by limiting the rancher￿ s ability to
make socially ine¢ cient choices of e1, while performance regulation continues to motivate
the rancher to pursue more socially e¢ cient choices of e2.
The results presented in this section provide a rationale for the reliance of FLMAs on in-
put mandates (grazing restrictions) in conjunction with penalties/bonuses based on observed
performance. Our model predicts that this regulatory mix will improve welfare relative to
performance regulation alone when monitoring provides a poor signal for how livestock graz-
32ing in￿ uences ecological health. Indeed, several studies have documented the di¢ cultly in
monitoring the relationship between livestock grazing and rangeland health. For example,
Holechek (1988) describes the challenges to setting appropriate grazing restrictions for a
public land allotment due to heterogeneity in vegetation, soil type, slope, and distance to
water, all of which lead to non-uniform forage utilization by livestock across an allotment.
7.2 Performance Regulation and Cost-Sharing
In this section we examine the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation.
Under this scenario, the regulator subsidizes (cost-sharing) or taxes the rancher￿ s use of
the observable input, e1, and mandates a payment based on the ex post realization of the
veri￿able performance measure, P. Similarly to Section 5.2, the cost of input e1 incurred
by the rancher is (1 ￿ sPC)w1e1, while the cost borne by the regulator is sPCw1e1. Thus,
sPC > 0 corresponds to cost-sharing and sPC < 0 corresponds to taxation. As in Sections 5.3
and 7.1, the ex post payment is made according to the linear incentive contract ￿ + ￿
PCP,
where ￿ is a lump-sum transfer between the regulator and the ￿rm and ￿
PC ￿ 0 is the piece
rate per unit of P.
The rancher￿ s optimization problem under the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and




F (e1;e2) ￿ (1 ￿ s
PC)w1e1 ￿ w2e2 + ￿ + ￿P (￿ e1;e2;￿1;￿2)
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, the regulator￿ s opti-



















































subject to the regulator￿ s budget constraint,














































































5 + ￿ ￿ 0:
(27)























































































In what follows, we focus on the scenario where the regulator￿ s optimal choices of sPC
and ￿
PC are such that ￿1 + ￿
PC (￿11 + ￿12￿1) > (1 ￿ c)w1 for all ￿1 2 [￿￿ ￿1;￿ ￿1] and ￿2 +
￿













for all ￿2 2 [￿￿ ￿2;￿ ￿2].
As in the previous section and for the same considerations, we restrict our focus in the
remainder of this section to the case where the regulator￿ s budget constraint does not bind.
34The solution to the unconstrained problem (28), denoted by ^ sPC and ^ ￿
PC





















































The expected social welfare under the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance



















If follows from (29) that the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation
unambiguously improves welfare over both cost-sharing/taxation and performance regula-
tion in isolation. That cost-sharing/taxation in combination with performance regulation
dominates cost-sharing/taxation alone follows directly from (11) and (29). Similarly, using
(18) and (29), it can be shown that cost-sharing/taxation in combination performance regu-
lation dominates performance regulation alone if and only if 1 ￿
￿





holds because ^ ￿
P
￿ 1.16 These results hold because cost-sharing/taxation improves welfare
by bringing the use of the observable input, e1, in line with its marginal social costs/marginal
social bene￿ts while still allowing the rancher the ￿ exibility to use his private knowledge of
ranch-level ecological conditions when making his input choices.
16Demonstrating this result using (18) and (29) requires the normalization E (Ve1) = E (Pe1). This
normalization is without loss of generallity provided the regulator is free to choose the unit of P.
35From (25) and (29), the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation is
more likely to dominate the joint use of an input mandate and performance regulation when
the performance measure provides a good signal of the in￿ uence of the observable input, e1,
on ecosystem health (i.e., low distortion (high Corr("1;￿1)) and noisiness (low V ar(Pei))).
The joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation has the advantage that it
gives the rancher an incentive to use his private knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions
when choosing e1. This advantage, however, only improves welfare relative to the joint use
of an input mandate and performance regulation when the performance measure provides a
good signal of e1￿ s in￿ uence on ecosystem health. When the performance measure provides
a poor signal, the joint use of an input mandate and performance regulation dominates by
￿xing the rancher￿ s choice of e1 at the ex ante social optimum, E [e￿
1 ("1)].
8 Discussion
We have developed a theoretical model of optimal regulation by a budget-constrained regu-
lator under asymmetric information, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring. We used the
model to evaluate the relative e¢ ciency of three prominent regulatory instruments on public
rangelands: input mandates, cost-sharing/taxation, and performance regulation. The model
extends the received literature by presenting an informational and institutional environment
that closely resembles the actual regulation of ranching on public rangeland and that allows
for the e¢ ciency of these three regulatory instruments to be evaluated and compared.
Our analysis yields a number of robust conclusions about the relative e¢ ciency of the
three regulatory instruments. First, we identify two scenarios under which an optimal input
mandate is superior to cost sharing/taxation and performance regulation. The ￿rst scenario
is when the regulator faces a relatively strict budget constraint so that she is limited in her
ability to elicit optimal input use through cost-sharing and performance regulation. The
second scenario is when the signal of the rancher￿ s use of inputs (the performance measure)
36is relatively uninformative. When the performance measure is relatively uninformative,
combining an input mandate with performance regulation can improve e¢ ciency. As we
explain in Section 7.1, this result provides a rationale for the reliance of budget-constrained
FLMAs on input mandates (i.e., grazing restrictions) in conjunction with penalties/bonuses
based on observed performance on public rangelands.
Second, similarly to an input mandate, cost-sharing/taxation improves welfare by bring-
ing the use of observable inputs in line with their marginal social costs/social bene￿ts. How-
ever, when there is congruence between the e⁄ect of an observable input on the rancher￿ s
private economic objective and on ecosystem health, the e¢ ciency of cost-sharing may be
undermined by the regulator￿ s budget constraint. We ￿nd that when the regulator is not
budget-constrained, a mixture of performance regulation and cost-sharing/taxation is the
optimal regulatory regime.
Third, we ￿nd that performance regulation improves social welfare when the performance
measure is a su¢ ciently accurate signal of how the rancher￿ s activities in￿ uence ecosystem
health. As one would expect, the optimal performance regulation under perfect monitoring
achieves the ￿rst-best outcome. One of the main advantages of performance regulation is
that, in contrast to an input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation, it gives the rancher the
incentives and ￿ exibility to use his private knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions
when making his input choices. Given the potential for considerable heterogeneity of range
conditions even within small geographic areas, this is an important bene￿t. Performance
regulation, however, has two disadvantages. First, the capacity of performance regulation
to achieve desired outcomes is limited under tight budget constraints, which restrict the
regulator￿ s ability to encourage e¢ cient input use through either performance bonuses or
penalties. Second, due to the di¢ culties of monitoring changes in rangeland health on each
ranch, FLMAs often have to base regulation on a very distorted or noisy signal of how the
rancher￿ s activities have in￿ uenced ecosystem health. Under these circumstances, perfor-
mance regulation can be dominated by an optimal input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation.
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P for some B if and only if U
C > U
P for all B: (30)















We demonstrate this result in three steps.
First, it follows directly from the expressions for UC and UP ((11) and (18), respectively)
that UC > UP for all B ￿ max
￿
BC;BP￿
























































































Using (32) and (33), we obtain that UC > UP for all B < min
￿
BC;BP￿





￿P(B) for all B < min
￿
BC;BP￿
. The latter inequality holds if and only if (31)
holds. Hence, UC > UP for all B < min
￿
BC;BP￿
if and only if (31) holds.







if and only if (31) holds. It follows from the expressions for BC and BP ((10) and (17),
44respectively) that BC > BP if and only if (31) holds. By continuity of UC and UP as
functions of B and equivalence between (31) and BC > BP; we have that UC > UP for













) if and only if (31) holds.
Combining the results proved in the above three steps, we obtain that UC > UP for all
B if and only if (31) holds. The inequality (31) is independent of B: Hence, UC > UP for
some B if and only if UC > UP for all B.
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